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THE BRENDAN BROWN LECTURE SERIES
SHAPING THE CHURCH: OVERCOMING THE




The past twenty-four months have been long and difficult for the
Roman Catholic Church and for people who have placed their trust in
Her. A seemingly endless stream of bad news has been revealed every
day since the first reports of scandal from Boston were reported on
+ General Counsel, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB), Washington,
D.C. Mr. Chopko is a graduate of the University of Scranton (B.S.) and Cornell Law
School (J.D.). This article is based on The Brendan Brown Lecture at the Columbus
School of Law, Catholic University of America, delivered January 15, 2003. See Columbus
School of Law, Catholic University of America, Wide Awake, Paying Attention and
Praying Hard (Jan. 2003) at http://law.cua.edu/news/prayinghard.cfm (last visited Dec. 19,
2003). A speaking text was previously published. See Mark E. Chopko, How Abuse
Scandal Exacerbated Other Existing Problems for the Church, ORIGINS, Vol. 32, No. 33
(Jan. 30, 2003). The author wishes to thank Professors Robert Destro and Harvey Dale
for their review, comment, encouragement, and support. The views expressed in this
article are the author's alone, and not necessarily those of the Conference of Bishops or
any of its members.
Because the lecture was presented to the Law School community, especially students,
some observations about the demands of the law practice offered in the lecture are
restated here for students:
As the chief lawyer to the Conference of Catholic Bishops in the United States, I
have watched the pressures on Bishops ebb and flow for sixteen years.
Regardless of the situation, the pressure and competing demands on Bishops is
enormous. Whether the issue is school funding, the allocation of community
resources, or clergy sexual misconduct, there is no end to the line of people who
have the "right" answer, as well as a critique of all the other suggested answers. I
have imagined my goal as creating a free space for a Bishop-free of the
demands of government officials, insurers, church bureaucrats, litigants, and
anyone else who would force a particular decision or approach on a Bishop. In
that free space, a Bishop would have the freedom to follow his best pastoral
instincts, and to seek and follow the Truth to serve the people, the Church, and
the common good. Sometimes this requires me to be an advocate, to defend the
institution from the outside world. Sometimes it requires me to be an insider, to
assure compliance with applicable laws. But it always requires that my moral
compass be on and fully functional, because lawyering for this client demands
rigorous attention to doing the right thing, not just the legal thing, every day. As
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January 6, 2002.1 According to opinion polls, the public, including us
Catholics, thinks less of the Bishops than they did in June 2002.2 The
work of those in positions as lawyers and administrators will continue for
at least another twelve months as the fallout from years of relentless
scandal is sorted out. The damage has been great and the cost in trust
and good relations with the people of God are only now being counted.
There is never a good time to have a public scandal, but this was
absolutely the wrong time. Like other religious institutions in this
society, Catholic institutions were already under tremendous pressures
from regulators, legislators, and litigants to conform their operations to
the prevailing cultural behaviors.3 The theme of this lecture is simple,
stark, and urgent: there are forces at work in society that will, unless
checked, radically remake the religious institutions serving the public.
4
Unless Catholics are prepared to defend our constitutional rights as a
community of believers, our gifts to the larger society in the areas of
a final note to all law students, every client will require that you speak the truth,
not just about the law, but about justice and what is right. The world is full of
lawyers who will say only what the law requires. There is a shortage of lawyers
who will fearlessly speak the truth. Every day there is some new struggle, and
you never know what will happen next.
1. On January 6, 2002, the Boston Globe began its reporting of files made public in
litigation over the alleged liability of the Archdiocese of Boston for the misconduct of
John Geoghan, a defrocked priest of the Archdiocese. Globe Spotlight Team, Church
Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at Al, available at
www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/010602-geoghan.htm; see also Walter V.
Robinson & Michael Paulson, The Cardinal's Apology, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2002, at
Al. Articles are collected in a special archive. Spotlight Investigation: Abuse in the
Catholic Church, BOSTON GLOBE, available at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/
abuse/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2003). Those files had been subject to a confidentiality order.
Kaththleen Burge, Judge's Ruling Frees Documents in Geoghan Case, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 30, 2001, at B5. When the judge who issued the confidentiality order was promoted
to the Court of Appeals, the Boston Globe renewed its request to lift the order before the
new judge, Judge Constance M. Sweeney. Id. Judge Sweeney granted the Globe's request
and those files, as well as files from dozens of other cases released by Judge Sweeney, have
been the fodder for daily stories since January 6, 2002. Id.; Spotlight Investigation, supra.
As noted below, the Geoghan story had been written about for years. See infra note 123
and accompanying text.
2. A December 2002 ABC News/Washington Post poll revealed that unfavorable
views of the Catholic Church increased throughout 2002, tripling among Catholics and
nearly doubling among non-Catholics. Dalia Sussman, Church Losing Confidence, ABC
News, Dec. 16, 2002, available at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/dailynews/
churchpoll021216.html. More to the point, negative reactions increased after the June
2002 meeting of the Bishops in Dallas when the Bishops committed to wholesale reform
policies for dioceses. Id.
3. Mark E. Chopko, Protecting Our Ministries in Public Service, Address at the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops November 2003 Bishops' Meeting (Nov. 12,





health, education, and welfare are in jeopardy. Those forces already are
there and are exacerbated by the scandal.
The Church must deal with both the push toward secularization and
the scandal. This article offers some thoughts about how society might
emerge from this present moment to re-engage the debate over the shape
and direction of our shared public life in the United States. In the
interim, we must deal with a bewildering array of challenges and much
confusion about which way to go.
Consider this story. A taxi driver and Bishop are killed in a car
crash-both ascend to heaven. The Bishop is assigned a tiny flat on a
main street. The cabbie is given a mansion. The Bishop complains and
asks St. Peter about the seeming disparity. Peter says, "Here in heaven,
we reward results. When you were doing your job, teaching and
preaching, what were the people doing?" The Bishop admitted that
many, okay most, of the people were asleep. Peter said, "Exactly. But
when the cabbie drove, everyone was wide awake, paying close attention
and praying hard."
Those of us who have been in the back of the cab called "Church" this
year have had much to watch, pray about, and worry over. Many have
wondered, "Who is driving? And where are we going?" Although the
answers may not be clear, we are wide awake, paying attention and
praying hard. Because of the uncertainty about the course and direction
of the Church as a whole, or perhaps because of disagreement over the
course and direction, many of us have been tempted to turn the
trajectory toward a favorite end point: we find answers in themes like
fidelity, breaking the clerical class, reformation of doctrine, or any
number of similar issues. There are as many suggestions as there are
Catholics, and that is very American. Catholics may be impatient about
waiting for anything, much less answers, and we are part of a culture that
values self-determination. We like taking things into our own hands and
shaping them ourselves. This temptation must be resisted, along with the
temptation to do nothing. If Catholics simply leave things alone,
individual litigants and their lawyers or government regulators will work
their wills on the Church. If this occurs, Catholics, and our society, will
be worse off. Catholics must help fix the Church, and not allow others to
re-make it.
II. Two CLEAR REFERENCE POINTS
First, let me state quite plainly that child abuse-a crime in both the
civil law and a horrible offense to the Commands of God-must be
stopped and the perpetrators brought to justice. The Catholic Bishops in
Dallas strengthened the path they began to walk more than fifteen years
20031
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ago by lifting up the voices of victims5 and honoring the Holy Father's
words that the priesthood is no place for anyone who would harm a
child.6 When Church ministers commit the crime or hide misconduct
through deliberate inaction or worse, they can and should be personally
responsible; our institutions can, and do, face liability claims based on
5. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Report of the National Review
Board, July 29, 2003, available at http://www.usccb.org/commlrestoretrust.htm (outlining
the course and scope of the Bishops' work on child abuse in the Church). Since the
summer meeting in 1985, the Bishops have been working collectively on this problem. Id.
At first, those efforts were made behind closed doors, but after the appointment of an ad
hoc Committee in 1993, the Bishops' work has been in public session and the Committee's
reports, three volumes entitled Restoring Trust, have been published. United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, Restoring Trust: Response to Clergy Sexual Abuse, Nov.
2002, available at http://www.usccb.org/comm/restoretrust.htm. From about 1997 until
2002, most stories about sexual abuse in the Church were episodic and local, but it was no
secret that priests who abused minors might have been returned to some ministry, after
"successful" treatment and with monitoring and other restrictions. Eugene C. Kennedy,
Culture Watch: The Church in Sexual Denial Also Denies Its Roots, NEWSDAY, Apr. 18,
2001, at B08; Brooks Egerton & Michal Saut, Statement Indicates Kos Told Psychiatrist He
Molested Boys, News Surprises Priest's Attorney, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 30, 1997,
at 1A. The ad hoc Committee in 1994 noted that such decisions were controversial and
required consultation with a pastoral team of parents, clergy, psychologists, lawyers and
other resource persons, and also should be accompanied with some disclosure, certainly to
co-workers and lay leadership. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Diocesan
Policies Dealing With Sexual Abuse of Minors, Nov. 1994, available at
http://www.usccb.org/comm/kit3.htm.
6. In April 2002, the Holy Father convened a special meeting of United States
Cardinals; the Conference President, Vice President, and General Secretary; and Curial
officials to review what was happening in the United States. United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops, Address of the Holy Father to the Cardinal of the U.S., Apr. 25, 2002,
available at http://www.usccb.org/comm/restoretrust.htm; see also Pope John Paul II,
Address of John Paul 11 to the Cardinals of the United States, Apr. 23, 2002, available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/2002/april/documents/hf-jp-ii-
spe 20020423_usa-cardinalsen.html. The communiques at the conclusion of the meeting
reflected an expectation by the Holy See that the USCCB produce a plan for attacking the
problem and anticipated a set of national canonical norms. See Extraordinary Meeting
Between the Cardinals of the United States, Final Communiqu6, at
http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/cardinals/documents/rc-cardinas-20020424-final-
communique.Ien.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). At meetings in June and November 2002,
the USCCB adopted a Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People and
Essential Norms for diocesan policies. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,
Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People, Nov. 2002, available at
http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2003). The Norms were
granted recognition by the Holy See in December 2002 and became the canon law for the
United States in March 2003. The text of the Essential Norms is found at
www.usccb.org/bishops/norms.htm; see also reprint in, Wm. Woestman, Ecclesiastical
Sanctions and the Penal Process, Appendix XXIV, at 349, et seq. (2d ed. 2003) (decree of
promulgation dated Dec. 12, 2002, note *). The decree of promulgation is described at
www.usccb.org/comm/archives/2002/02-258.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2004).
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what leaders, in fact, knew.7 Although everyone needs to recognize that
the first responsibility of Catholics is to serve all the people of God
through our churches and institutions. We have a responsibility to
resolve these claims justly, whether the civil law requires it or not.
Another key point of reference concerns the law and the Church. The
Church is not above the laws of the United States, but operates within
the rule of law. The Church is subject to a myriad of laws and
regulations." However, the Church also operates within a constitutional
7. In articulating the proposition this way, one distinguishes between crimes of
abuse committed by individual clerics, employees, or volunteers, any of whom can be
considered "ministers," according to the use of the term in legal literature. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 2000). The
notion of "minister" and "ministry" is not dependent on categorical classes of ordained
versus non-ordained, but turns on the function of the position. Id. On the other hand, the
possibility of the leadership committing a crime is real but remote. For example, if clergy
are not required reporters of abuse, a Bishop's failure to report abuse is not a crime. On
the other hand, the Archdiocese of Cincinnati pled nolo contendere to five violations of an
Ohio statute for their failure to report a felony, one for each year from 1978 to 1982. State
of Ohio v. Archdiocese of Cincinnatti, Case No. B 0311000, Court of Common Pleas,
Hamilton County, OH (Richard Niehaus, Judge). Although very few states have broad
child endangerment laws, such as New Hampshire, even those states have hurdles to
prosecutions based on knowledge and intent. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639.3 (2001).
A Bishop would not allow a priest to continue in ministry knowing with certainty that
another person would be harmed. However, such re-assignments have always presented a
risk of re-offense, and actual knowledge of a prior assault could form the basis for a
negligent supervision claim. In this regard, absent some specific knowledge about the
infirmity of the cleric, those cases ascribing all inferences from all conduct as creating
liability because a Bishop, looking back "should have known," go too far. E.g., Koenig v.
Lambert, 527 N.W.2d 903, 905 (S.D. 1995) (ascribing knowledge from repeated
confessions in the diocese), overruled on other grounds by Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 567
N.W.2d 220 (S.D. 1997). Those kinds of claims too often invite courts to examine Church
disciplinary systems implicating constitutional concerns. See Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of
Milwaukee, 533 N.W.2d 780, 790 (Wisc. 1995) (determining that "the First Amendment
... prevents the courts ... from determining what makes one competent to serve as a
Catholic priest"); Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society, 738 A.2d 839, 848 (Me.
1999) ("Allowing a secular court or jury to determine whether a church and its clergy have
sufficiently disciplined, sanctioned, or counseled a church member would insert the State
into church matters in a fashion wholly forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment."). The same problem is not presented where the knowledge is clear and the
re-assignment is intentional, accepting the risk of a future occurrence however unlikely a
Bishop and his advisors think it might be. Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo.
1997) (alleging the Diocese acted intentionally in its improper investigation of a priest who
allegedly had sexually abused a minor).
8. Thomas J. Paprocki, Methods of Avoiding Trials, in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE
CODE OF CANON LAW, 1803-04 (John P. Beal, et al. eds., 2000) ("In fact, as long as civil
laws are not contrary to divine law or unless canon law provides otherwise, canon law
often defers to civil laws (c. 22), especially civil contract law (c. 1290), labor laws (cc. 231,
§2 and 1286), prescription (cc. 197-199 and 1268-1270), the laws of wills and inheritance (c.
1299, §2), and probably also tort law (compensation for negligent and intentional harms
and injuries; see c. 128).").
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regime set in place more than 210 years ago; that regime rests on the idea
that the functions of both religion and government work best if they are
kept separate.9 The legitimate functions of religion do not belong to
government and vice versa. ° This idea is enshrined in the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
Those sixteen simple words overflow with complex political,
cultural, and legal meanings. Those who seek to make religion the basis
of government would make religious dogma the law of the State. 2 Those
who demand that all religious traces be stripped from public life,
including those religious institutions who serve the common good, make
the law of the State into religious dogma.'3  Both are wrong. Each
institution-religion and government-has autonomy appropriate to its
sphere.
The guarantee of this institutional autonomy is not some mere
technicality or exception to the rule; it is the rule, wrought from difficult
conflict and offered to point the way to a preservation of authentic
freedom for religion in the United States. 4 The First Amendment was
part of the price demanded by the States in exchange for their votes of
ratification of the Constitution. 5 There are, therefore, limits on what
9. E.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948); Everson
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). But see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971) (noting that total separation is impossible).
10. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (explaining that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment prohibits states and the federal government from setting up a church).
11. U.S. CONST. amend I. This article does not debate whether there is one Clause or
two Clauses. E.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN 217 n.21 (2000). I accept
the convention in the Supreme Court's cases that reflect an Establishment Clause and a
Free Exercise Clause. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972). Both, according
to the Court, are complementary and buttress the idea of religious liberty. Id.
12. Javier Martinez-Torr6n & Rafael Navarro-Valls, The Protection of Religious
Freedom in the System of the European Convention on Human Rights, 9 HELSINKI
MONITOR 25, 35-36 (1998).
13. Id. This problem exists not just here in the United States but elsewhere, as
democracies struggle to balance the rights of religious minorities and religious institutions
with the common good. Id.
14. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (stating that the Court "will
not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with
religion").
15. States addressed the need for express protection of religious freedom. GEORGE
CLINTON, SUPPLEMENT TO THE JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (1787),
reprinted in 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328
(Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed., Phil., J.B Lippincott Co. 1901); DANIEL OWEN,
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF RHODE
ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1790), reprinted in 1 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 334 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed., Phil., J.B
Lippincott Co. 1901); ANOTHER ENGROSSED FORM OF THE RATIFICATION (June 27,
[Vol. 53:125
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religion can demand of the government (e.g., government-sponsored
prayer) and what government can demand of religion (e.g., disregarding
religious teaching in the religious workplace).
Church autonomy forms one critical aspect of the constitutionally
mandated separation between governmental and religious entities that
has been expressly noted in the case law." In the nineteenth century,
Watson v. Jones17 concluded that a church's decisions on questions of
ecclesiatical discipline, faith, and law, and the application of those
principles belong solely to the church, not the government.18 A half
century later, in Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,"9 the
Court applied the same rule to hold that the government, even applying
secular law, could not prescribe standards for church office. 0 Those pre-
incorporation decisions were elevated to constitutional principle in the
1952 decision, Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.21
Kedroff held an attempt by the New York legislature to divest
ownership of the Russian Orthodox Cathedral from the Church in Russia
22to a U.S. faction to be unconstitutional. 2 The Court embraced and
expanded Watson, explaining that the principle of religious autonomy
embraces "an independence from secular control or manipulation-in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine., 23 It
is clear that religious autonomy is not merely a power to believe, but also
extends to apply those beliefs in concrete ways in religious organizations.
Religious institutions have broad autonomy to order their internal affairs
according to religious doctrine and should not have to recede from
24religiously motivated actions for fear of legislators, regulators, or courts.Those robust rights are threatened today.
1788), reprinted in 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 659
(Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed., Phil., J.B Lippincott Co. 1901); DEBATES IN THE
CONVENTION OF NORTH CAROLINA ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION reprinted in DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 244 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed., Phil., J.B Lippincott Co. 1901).
16. E.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
17. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
18. Id. at 727. Watson has been cited numerous times for this principle.
19. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
20. Id. at 16.
21. 344 U.S. 94, 113-16 (1952). See also Presbyterian Church v. Mary E.B. Hull Mem.
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969); Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514,
1538 n.24 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining the relationship of Watson, Gonzalez, and Kedroff).
22. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119, 121.
23. Id. at 115-16.
24. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341-44 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
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III. PRESSURES TOWARD SECULARIZATION
Some in this society would shape religious institutions, through the
civil courts and the legislatures, to be clones of public institutions in all
but the most trivial ways. The current scandal over the response to
sexual abuse only serves to accelerate this existing trend toward shaping
the Catholic Church to the prevailing culture, through litigation and
legislation or regulatory action.25 Each is examined in turn.
A. Litigation
Cases are frequently filed in the United States that target a class of
defendants that is related through a common commitment to some
26undertaking; that commonality is, at times, the same religious faith.
These may be referred to as "nameplate" cases because all the
defendants have some common name, such as Catholic, Lutheran, etc.
27
Nameplate cases can also include litigation against other institutions,
28such as schools and the Boy Scouts of America. The theory is that one
sues all possible defendants, and those defendants will sort out who is
29responsible among them by pointing the finger at the proper party.
These cases allege that the institutional structure masks some larger anti-
societal conspiracy.30 Consider the following real examples.
Some years ago in the litigation brought against the Dallas Diocese
and the Conference of Bishops, the plaintiffs charged that the Church
had not behaved "as a reasonably prudent religious organization."3 One
might ask: Compared to what? The Lutherans or the Presbyterians? At
the same time in a neighboring state, a lawsuit was filed against the
25. See Gustav Niebuhr, Dioceses Settle Case of Man Accusing Priest of Molestation,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2001, at A17.
26. See Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 1089, 1091-94 & n.6 (2003) (discussing Krider v. General Council on Finance &
Administration, a non-Catholic case where a plaintiff named the local church, regional
judicatory, and a national Methodist body in a suit resulting from a ladder accident).
27. Sessions of the American Corporate Counsel Association (1999) and the
American Bar Association, Tort and Insurance Practice Section (2000), presented a
review of this litigation phenomenon. Outlines and other materials were available
through ACCA and the ABA/TIPS. A version of the ABA presentation was published in
the United Kingdom. Mark E. Chopko, Emerging Liability Issues in Non-Profit
Organizations: An Overview, 8 CHARITY LAW & PRACTICE REVIEW, 17-34 (2002).
28. Id. at 25-26.
29. Mark E. Chopko, Ascending Liability of Religious Entities for the Actions of
Others, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 289, 294-95 (1993).
30. See id.
31. Doe IV v. Diocese of Dallas, Amended Complaint, Count I, para. 28, No. 93-
05258-G (134th Judicial District). The decision by the judge to refuse to dismiss this claim
fueled a discovery dispute and a motion to compel. See infra note 37.
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National Assembly of the Presbyterian Church-USA (PC-USA).32 This
lawsuit resulted from the sexual misconduct of a minister who served in
regional judicatories of the PC-USA in two states.33 The basis of the
lawsuit was a statement in the PC-USA's Book of Discipline that the
action of one Presbyterian agency is the action of all." In accordance
with this theory, the negligence of one became the negligence of all. The
intended defendants were every current and former member of the
Prebyterian Church.35  The case against PC-USA was properly
dismissed,36 but the Dallas case resulted in a verdict of nearly $120
37million against the Diocese. Both cases were framed on the same
flawed idea that people bound together in faith consent to be legally
bound to each other in tort liability.38 The claimants in these cases invite
32. N.H. v. Presbyterian Church, (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 597 (Okla. 1999).
33. Id. at 594-96. Ultimately, the minister was sentenced to prison and died at the
hands of fellow inmates. Barbara Hoberock, Former Minister Fatally Stabbed in Prison
Cell, TULSA WORLD, June 14, 1994, at N9, available at
http://www.reformation.com/CSA/brigdenl.htm.
34. Hosey v. Presbyterian Church (USA), Petition, paras. IV, 3-5, V, I-K (Sept. 30,
1997).
35. Id. Petition, IV, paras. 3-5. See also Appellants' Brief at 1, N.H. v. Presbytarian
Church (USA), 998 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1999) (plaintiffs seek a judgment to be enforced
against any Presbyterian church body or entity wherever found).
36. N.H., 998 P.2d at 603. The trial court found the invocation of the Book of
Discipline to reach every Church member necessarily implicated the Constitution, and
dismissed the case on that basis. Id. at 597. On direct appeal to the state supreme court,
the dismissal was affirmed, but on narrower, common law grounds. Id. at 602-03. In the
Presbyterian Church, like the Catholic Church and other churches, discipline and
supervision of clergy is vested only in the regional jurisdictories called presbyteries, what
Catholics might call "dioceses" or Lutherans call "synods." PC (USA) BOOK OF ORDER,
section G-11.0103n (Responsibilities of Presbyteries: to "ordain, receive, dismiss, install,
remove, and discipline ministers .... "). Text available at http://www.pcusa.org. All
knowledge of the minister's crimes remained in the presbyteries involved and never
reached the national assembly. N.H., 998 P.2d at 601. No knowledge meant no basis for
liability based on supervision. Id. The court noted the division of cases on the
constitutionality of negligent supervision. Id. at 602 n.47.
37. See BETRAYAL: THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 43 (Ben Bradlee Jr. ed.,
2002). The jury returned its verdict in July 1997 against the Dallas Diocese alone. Id. The
verdict eventually was resolved by settlement for around $30 million. Id. The claims
against the USCCB were made the subject of the Conference's petition for writ of
mandamus of the judge's decision to compel discovery. United States Catholic
Conference of Bishops v. Ashby, No. 95-0250 (Aug. 1996). The Texas Supreme Court
stayed proceedings against the Conference in March 1995, pending further review. In July
1996 the Court set the petition for argument, overruling all attempts by plaintiffs to
dismiss it. Id. Literally on the eve of oral argument, all plaintiffs dismissed all claims
against the Conference. Id. One lawyer admitted her clients could not prevail on their
claims. Id.
38. Both cases also target a class of defendants beyond the defendant civilly
empowered and bound to act against an offending minister. In New Hampshire, the target
2003]
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the courts to discard the Constitution, as well as the actual structure of
the churches, to grant relief.
B. Regulatory and Legislative Pressures
There are four examples of regulatory demands that religious
institutions have faced and will face, in increasing degree and amount.
Each instance proposes to force religious institutions to choose between
religious identity and service to their communities. The pressures are
sometimes direct, sometimes more insidious, but always involve a
seemingly broad regulatory mandate that causes a disproportionate
impact on religious institutions. This trend was accelerated by the end of
the strict scrutiny standard in claims of violations of religious rights
following Employment Division v. Smith3 9 in 1990, and the subsequent
demise of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act(° in 1997.4' The State
may now challenge religion if done in a neutral and general way without
42ever facing a searching judicial review.
First, religious institutions are pressured to deliver services exactly as
their secular counterparts. 4  This is evidenced by the demand of
government agencies that review combinations in healthcare, and the
constant threat of litigation by Planned Parenthood and others over what
they see as a loss of reproductive health services.4 Whenever healthcare
is the national assembly of PC-USA. In Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, the USCCB was a
target. Neither entity legally was the supervisor of the offending cleric.
39. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Prior to Smith, a prima facie claim of religious infringement
shifted the burden of proof to the government to show (1) a compelling interest
accomplished through (2) the least restrictive means. Id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963)). After Smith, neutral, generally applicable rules prevail,
unless the person shows the government acted unreasonably. Id. at 884-85. This holds
true although the new rules may directly burden religious rights. Id.
40. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). The
universal condemnation of Smith was followed by the passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993.
41. The Supreme Court later invalidated RFRA as applied to the states in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
42. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534-35.
43. For example, the National Women's Law Center (NWLC) published a
monograph reviewing strategies for policing religious organizations. ELENA N. COHEN &
JILL C. MORRISON, HOSPITAL MERGERS AND THE THREAT TO WOMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES: USING CHARITABLE ASSETS LAWS TO FIGHT
BANK 1 (National Women's Law Center, Wash., DC, 2001), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/mergerca.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Nathan Littauer Hosp. Ass'n v. Spitzer, 734 N.Y.S.2d 671, 675 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001). "Merger Watch" and other projects of the Planned Parenthood
Federation specifically target joint operating agreements and other initiatives because
Catholic healthcare will not offer abortion services. A Clash of Religious Doctrine and




combinations are presented, challenges arise over certificates of need,
state antitrust laws, and other grounds." The real target is to restrict
Catholic or other healthcare groups that will not offer abortion services.46
The premise on which the State acts is that abortion is a public service, or
"health care," provided by publicly supported institutions, or
"hospitals."
47
Although many legal bases for state action are asserted, one powerful
regulatory act is a governmental attempt to impress a public charitable
trust on private charitable assets.4 8  This action has been applied to
situations involving the sale of large charities, such as hospitals.49 The
idea is that public support, when coupled with community service,
creates a public charity subject to plenary state attorney general control.0
This approach is not limited to agencies that serve the public, but can
apply fairly broadly." A state supreme court adopted this action in a
lawsuit brought by dissenting members over the evangelism of the
leadership of the Christian Science religion." The religious dissenters
urged the courts to intervene, arguing that Mary Baker Eddy's trust was
being administered wastefully, and contrary to the dissenters' belief of
her vision for the Church.53 The Church protested the litigation under
the First Amendment and a number in the religious community joined an
amicus brief urging dismissal 4 The Massachusetts Supreme Court held
that the dissenters could not sue the church over the evangelism efforts,
not because the Constitution barred litigation over church doctrine, as
the religious amici urged, but because only the State could regulate
public charitable trusts 5  Some state regulators have taken the position
that these charities are a trust for the community and cannot be sold or
45. Spitzer, 734 N.Y.S.2d at 673-74.
46. See COHEN & MORRISON, supra note 43, at 5-6.
47. See id. at 2.
48. The NWLC urges use of this tactic against religious charities. Id. at 17-18. The
tactic rests on an assumption that the local community, through donations and volunteer
service, underwrites the charity, making its control and disposition a matter of public
concern. See id.
49. Id. at 30-32 (discussing the proposed consolidation of Good Samaritan and St.
Mary's Hospitals in West Palm Beach, Florida).
50. Id. at 2, 24.
51. See id. at 23-24.
52. Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918, 918, 922 (Mass. 1997). The ostensible theory
was the regulation of a charitable trust. Id. In fact, the dispute was about evangelization
in an electronic age. Id. at 919.
53. Id. at 919-20.
54. Id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Americans United for Separation of Church
and State at 1, Weaver v. Wood, 680 N.E.2d 918 (Mass. 1997) (No. 07156).
55. Weaver, 680 N.E.2d at 922. The means of spreading the Gospel by Churches
would seem obvious (even to regulators) to be beyond the governmental power.
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significantly changed without government approval.56  The purpose of
such approval is to assure that the years of local giving and volunteerism
are protected.57  If accepted, such a power would sweep far beyond
service providers, to schools and church buildings, or anything open to
and supported by the public-even through private donations.
Second, calls are increasing in certain circles for a conditioning of tax
exemption status on an institution's willingness to abide by either the
governing secular model or public policy. This call is based in part on a
Supreme Court decision denying an exemption to Bob Jones University
because it sanctioned racial discrimination contrary to "public policy.
5 8
Some have called for extending that disqualification to institutions that
discriminate on other grounds, e.g., on the basis of gender.59 Recently, a
case was filed against the Bishops Conference and the Internal Revenue
Service to revoke the Bishops Conference's tax exemption.6°  The
plaintiff was a woman who applied to the seminary and was told she
could not be ordained a priest of the Catholic Church. 61 Although the
case was dismissed on a variety of grounds, it illustrates that there are
those who would use the courts to secularize the Church or cause it to
forfeit benefits. In other states there have been attempts to preclude the
extension of tax-free bond financing to Catholic hospitals because they
56. Catherine Wells, Churches, Charities, and Corrective Justice: Making Churches
Pay for the Sins of Their Clergy, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1201,1203,1210-11 (2003).
57. Id. at 1211.
58. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-93, 595-96 (1983). The Court
held that religious schools that discriminate on the basis of race do not qualify as tax
exempt entities and contributions to them are not tax deductible. Id. at 595-96. The
Constitution did not compel a different result. See id. at 594-95 (citing an Executive Order
by President Kennedy in 1962). Some commentators have urged a broader reading of
Bob Jones and deny tax exemptions (which they see only as a subsidy, and not as an
accommodation or autonomy issue) to any institution that discriminates on gender, sexual
preference, or a host of other potential public policy grounds. E.g., David A. Brennan,
Tax Expenditures, Social Justice, and Civil Rights: Expanding the Scope of Civil Rights
Laws to Apply to Tax-Exempt Charities, 2001 BYU L. REV. 167, 169-72.
59. E.g., Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for
Applying Employment Discrimination to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1124-25
(1996).
60. Rockwell v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, No. 02-239-M, 2002 WL
31432673 (D. N.H. Oct. 30, 2002), affg No. Civ. 02-239-M, 2002 WL 1790579 (D. N.H.
Aug. 5, 2002).
61. Id. at *1. Three Catholic agencies were named as defendants, including USCCB.
Id. The trial court, applying local rules for prose complaints, reviewed the complaint and
dismissed it sua sponte, finding no legal basis on which to proceed. Id. at *1-*3. At the




62practice medicine according to the Church's religious tradition. In this
way, a relationship exists to the first trend or pressure.63
Third, there are efforts to restrict the ability of a religious agency to
exercise employment preferences based on religious values, which an
exemption in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly
protects,64 if that agency participates in government contracts.65  This
issue has been a prominent part of the debate over the President's Faith. . 66
Based Organizations initiative. At the federal level, such a restriction
would change a major provision in the original charitable choice law
dealing with welfare reform, which provides that religious institutions are
not required to sacrifice their institutional autonomy or Title VII
religious employer exemption to participate in such a government67
program. Even if the federal exemption is preserved, restrictions on
religious preferences in employment increasingly will be a feature of the
68efforts of local and state governments.
At stake here is a principle of common sense and a right of
constitutional dimension. In today's society, it is generally accepted that
companies can hire those who agree with the mission of the company.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) would not be forced to
retain a staffer who publicly rebuked efforts to promote civil liberties.
An environmental protection group would not be required to retain a
62. See, e.g., Assemb. 525, 1999 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1999). California has considered and,
under pressure, rejected attempts to impose such conditions. See id.
63. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text. Although the pressure on service
delivery is direct and overt, the denial of tax exemption or access to tax exempt bonds is
indirect. See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000); David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-
based Organizations, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1396 n.6 (2003).
65. For example, several religious, civil rights, labor, education, and health
organizations formed the Coalition Against Religious Discrimination, operating to end the
religious employer exemption. See Letter from the Coaltion Against Religious
Discrimination to the United States House of Representatives (May 6, 2002), at
http://www.americanhumanist.org/press/coalitionreligious.html; Letter from the Coalition
Against Religious Discrimination to the Honorable George W. Bush, President of the
United States (Jan. 30, 2001), at http://www.house.gov/scott/c-choice/letter.to.pres.
bush.from.coalition.01.30.01.pdf.
66. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Roundtable on Religion & Soc. Welfare Policy,
Government Partnerships with Faith-Based Service Providers (2002), at
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/reports/12-4-2002 state-of-thejlaw.pdf.
The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy has reviewed the current debate
over the law and public policy in December 2002 and in December 2003.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d), (f) (2000).
68. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12B.2(b) (2003), available at
http://www.sfgov.org/site/sfhumanrights-page.asp?id=5922#secl2b.2 (last visited Nov. 18,
2003) (limiting government contracts, unless the contractor provides domestic partnership
benefits to employees).
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staffer who argued the Endangered Species Act was unnecessary and
wasteful. Microsoft would not be forced to retain an employee who
operated web sites proclaiming Bill Gates is a monopolist. The ACLU,
other advocacy groups, and even Microsoft, like other employers, are
entitled to a work force that does not publicly discredit the institution
based on their conduct. 69 This is one of the lessons of Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale.70 Mr. Dale, as an assistant scout master, publicly
became associated with a gay rights group, and said he intended to use
this public forum to reform the Boy Scouts' refusal to allow gay men as
scout leaders." The U.S. Supreme Court overruled a state supreme court
and held that the Scouts constitutionally could insist on associating
12
leaders based on their willingness publicly to adhere to that message.
Dale illustrates that private groups have the right to insist that their
leaders and their practices reflect the group mission, even if the leaders
do not believe in the mission. In the area of religion, this right is more
fundamental. The mission of religious institutions is measured by
religious doctrine and practice. Religious groups have the same ability to
employ those who reflect the values and teaching of the religion as
secular agencies. The mission of religious institutions is not civil liberties,
the environment, or computers, or even Scouting, but religion. Plainly,
some people inside religious organizations disagree with aspects of the
teaching and values of the institution and wish to use the civil law to
force change on religious institutions. 73  The mantra of civil rights is
repeated in these debates, forgetting that freedom of religion is the first
69. It is well settled that institutions may not be forced to retain employees whose
goals or actions are intended to communicate a message contrary to the employer. Boyd
v. Harding Academy, 88 F.3d 410, 414-15 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that it was acceptable to
terminate a preschool teacher for engaging in premarital sex); Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 701, 705 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that an employee may be
terminated for violating the club's "role model rule"); Harvey v. YWCA, 533 F.Supp. 949,
955 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (holding that the YMCA is not required to employ counselors who
maintain "an alternative lifestyle"). See also Hall v. Baptist Memorial Health Care Corp.,
27 F.Supp. 2d 1029, 1038 (W.D. Tenn. 1998) (indicating that homosexuality is
incompatible with job of Student Services Specialist). Political parties also have the right
to prevent their ranks from invasion by those of differing political principles. Democratic
Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 760-62
(1973).
70. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
71. Id. at 640 (2000).
72. Id. at 644, 646, 661.
73. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The plaintiffs in Weaver v. Wood
were Christian Scientists. 680 N.E.2d 918, 918-19 (Mass. 1997). The litigants in most
employment litigation against religious institutions belong to the defendant institution.
E.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Maguire v. Marquette Univ.,
814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987).
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civil right proclaimed in the constitutional text.74 Religious people and
their institutions also have civil rights. Others are confused about the
nature of religious organizations and forget that when such an
organization loses the right to direct and shape itself according to
religious doctrine, it ceases to be a religious institution.75 Yet, others do
not recognize that the law allows a diversity of religious structures to
serve a diverse and pluralistic society.76  Many may believe these
pressures will make religious institutions more "American", and by that
they mean purely democratic, and yet they would prefer the secular
model.77 One set structure and set of behaviors for all churches is
actually un-American. Historically, the constitutional system has
allowed a multiplicity of beliefs and practices to flourish. 7' These efforts
are unconstitutional because they allow the government to invade the
internal, faith-directed practices of the Church. More than that, these
efforts are an affront to plain old common sense. Everyone else has a
self-evident right to hire and fire according to the institutional mission.
Why not religion?
Fourth, an issue that is moving quickly in the state legislatures and the
courts is the addition of mandatory contraceptive coverage to employer-
provided health or prescription drug plans. 79 This issue, along with the
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75. See Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 825 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(involving a non-Catholic records clerk who proselytized his Catholic co-workers at
breaks). After he was fired, the clerk sued, alleging religious discrimination. Id. at 829. A
California intermediate appellate court agreed, finding that a public policy interest
trumped a state law exempting religious institutions. Id. at 836. The California Supreme
Court reversed, holding that federal and state constitutions give religious employers some
latitude in hiring according to their mission. Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 45 P.3d 1162, 1169
(Cal. 2002).
76. Mark E. Chopko, Intentional Values and the Public Interest-A Plea for
Consistency in Church/State Relations, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1143, 1178-81 (1990). In a
southern California case, regulators sought to condition a homeless services contract on
renaming the Saint Vincent de Paul Center the Mr. Vincent de Paul Center. See Mark E.
Chopko, Don't Exclude the Churches, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 29, 1988, at 14. Regulators backed
down when confronted with the silliness of the suggestion. Id.
77. There is a long historical struggle over using the law to "Americanize" the
Church. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Illiberal Liberalism: Liberal Theology, Anti-
Catholicism, and Church Property, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 693, 710 et.seq. (2002)
(discussing intentions of New York legislators in the 1850s to force Catholic agencies into
the congregational property model).
78. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) ("When the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of
public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.").
79. The trigger for contraceptive coverage is the presence of an employer health
insurance program that provides prescription drug coverage. Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 182 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2001),
review granted, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (Cal. 2001). If drugs are covered, all FDA-approved
2003]
Catholic University Law Review
eradication of any religious conscience exception, has become a top
legislative priority of Planned Parenthood.8° Part of that strategy appears
to be the passage of these mandatory coverage laws with as little public
attention as possible so as not to attract opposition or amendment.8,
Some states have enacted these laws with broad and conscientious
protection for religious employers faced with contraceptive mandates,
but others have denied the exemption to those religious employers who
serve the community.82  Litigation in California and New York has
directly challenged the laws denying exemptions and offered a
constitutional basis for the Church's claims.83 The California Third
District Court of Appeals has rejected the claim of Sacramento Catholic
Charities for a constitutionally required exemption from the
contraceptive mandates law.84 A trial court in New York has rejected the
constitutional claim, relying on the California appellate decision.
8
1
The contraceptive mandate laws change everything about the proper
limits on the government to dictate the internal faith-driven practices of
religious institutions. These mandates infringe upon the religious
expression of church employers, and invert the constitutional order on
contraceptive drugs (including abortifacient) must be included. Id. at 182 n.l. Catholic
institutions cover prescription drugs as an expression of Catholic social teaching. Id. at
184. Thus, these laws present a classic dilemma. See id.
80. See Shannon Criniti, Refusal Clauses: Limitations on Reproductive Rights,
available at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/articles/exemptions.html (last visited Nov.
18, 2003).
81. See Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, NEWSLETTER, Aug. 2001,
available at http://www.ppmw.org/news/august2000newsletter.pdf. In the District of
Columbia, such a bill was added after Catholic leaders were told no such measure would
be proposed. The bill passed the City Council and was "pocket vetoed" by the Mayor
after threatened intervention by the U.S. House of Representatives. The history of the
bill is discussed in City Council Refuses Conscience Clause, ZENIT.ORG (Jul. 12, 2000), at
http://www.consciencelaws.org/Examining-Conscience-issues/background/Contracept/
BackContracept0l.html.
82. Planned Parenthood of Western Washington, States with Laws Requiring Full
Contraceptive Coverage (1998-2000), http://www.covermypills.org/facts/states-law.asp (last
visited Nov. 18, 2003) (providing a list of relevant states and noting those with religious
exemptions).
83. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181; Catholic Charities
of Albany v. Serio, No. 8229-02 (Albany County 2002).
84. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176. The case was
argued on December 2, 2003, and awaits a decision by March 1, 2004, under the rules of
the court. See Supreme Court Calendar, Special Session-San Jose, available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/calendars/documents/SDECAO3.PDF (last visited Dec.
2, 2003).
85. Catholic Charities of Albany, No. 8229-02. Summary judgment was denied to
Catholic Charities on November 25, 2003 (slip op.), and an appeal was filed in the state




religious freedom issues and religious autonomy. If upheld, these
mandates would revolutionize the essential power of the government in
ways every citizen should find dangerous and offensive.
Research by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
(USCCB) legal office has not yielded any case where government has
forced a religion to pay for something out of its funds that the religion
teaches is immoral. 86 There is one possible historical analogue. In
Colonial Virginia, a tax was proposed that was to be used to support
religious teachers.87 Who could object to such a bill, which was supported
broadly by the legislature and perceived to advance the very nature of
human persons, thereby enhancing one's relationship with God? James
Madison rallied support against the bill in his famous Memorial and
Remonstrance:
The Religion ... of every man must be left to the conviction
and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to
exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an
unalienable right .... We maintain therefore that in matters of
Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its
cognizance. 88
Madison acknowledged that once the principle was established that
government had the power to compel such violations of conscience, there
was no real limitation on that authority.8 9 Therefore, rather than wait for
the powerful State to come to the door, "it is proper to take alarm at the
first experiment on our liberties." 9
The situation involving contraceptive mandates is even more offensive.
Madison was protesting a tax (placed evenly on citizens) from which
direct tax support for religion would be offered.9' No one is proposing a
state-sponsored insurance fund that might underwrite a public program;
86. See JOHN NOONAN, THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY 71 (1998).
87. Id. at 71-72.
88. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947) (reprinted as an appendix, James
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, para. 1); see NOONAN, supra note 86, at 72.
89. NOONAN, supra note 86, at 73.
90. Everson, 330 U.S. at 65.
91. See NOONAN, supra note 86, at 71-72. There are numerous challenges to taxation
alleging that the tax program supports public initiatives that are offensive to religious
conscience, e.g., war. Yet every effort to compel an exemption on religious grounds from
the general tax program has been defeated. E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254
(1982). Even an attempt to limit taxation on religious goods for sale has been rejected.
Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 380, 382, 384 (1990).
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the contraceptive mandate is a requirement placed on employers and
92
funded by employers. Mr. Madison would be outraged.
The cases decided under the Religion Clause make clear that the
government lacks the power to dictate choices inside a religious• 93
institution that are controlled by religious doctrine. Gonzalez v.
Archbishop of Manila presented a controversy over enforcement of a
private beneficial trust, which was trumped by religious institutional
rights when litigants attempted to use the trust to circumvent Church
law.94 Kedroff involved a legislative attempt to decide who would hold
power in a church.95 Any governmental attempt to intrude into the inner
order and governance of a church by artificially classifying certainS • 96
matters as non-religious is per se unconstitutional. The State lacks the
constitutional power to determine which issues are "religious" for a
religion, or to "determine the place of a particular belief in a religion.,
97
Some state laws provide a so-called "religious employer" exemption
from the contraceptive mandate.98 However, the exemption is designed
not to exempt religious institutions by a narrow limitation to those
institutions that teach their own, serve their own, and hire their own
adherents. 99 If a religious institution's interpretation of Scripture causes
it to look outward and serve the broader community, no exemption
92. See Petitioners Brief on the Merits at 5-8, Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001). Far from being a neutral law enacted out of
concern for the welfare of women, the California act and its history reveal a direct attempt
to violate the rights of Catholic employers in particular. See id. When a similar mandate
could only pass with a broad religious exemption, proponents pulled the legislation rather
than accommodate religion. Id.
93. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95 (1953); Gonzales v.
Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 11-14, 19 (1929).
94. Gonzales, 280 U.S. at 11-14, 19.
95. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 95-96.
96. Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 190-91 (1960) (per curiam).
97. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450
U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
98. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1) (Deering 2003); N.Y.
INS. LAW § 4303(cc)(1)(A) (McKinney 2003).
99. New York, California, and other states have a so-called exemption for "religious
employers," defined as:
an entity for which each of the following is true:
(A) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity.
(B) The entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the
entity.
(C) The entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the
entity.
(D) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described in Section 6033(a)(2)(A)i
or iii, of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1) (Deering 2003). The New York Law is
identical. N.Y. INS. LAW. § 4303(cc)(1)(A) (McKinney 2003).
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applies.' ° Under this definition, Mother Teresa's Missionaries of Charity
are "secular" employers because they do not limit their care of AIDS
victims to Catholics. 1 By enacting this legislation, the State claims the
power to classify among admittedly religious institutions according to the
State's determination of what is and is not religious. The government
claims that it has the authority to regulate all matters within a
workplace-even a workplace that is ordered and regulated according to
religious teaching-as long as the regulation makes no derogatory
statements about religion. '°2 In other words, the government appears to
be religion-neutral. A closer look, however, reveals the inherently
religious exercise in which the State is engaged.
The exemption statute classifies religious institutions according to
whether the State ultimately thinks the institution exists to "inculcat[e]
• * . religious values."'' 3  The State is therefore classifying religious
institutions somewhere on the continuum of its definition of
"inculcation." Whether this means proselytizing directly, simply teaching
about religion, or offering public witness about religious values through
the provision of charity, indirect evangelism, or something else entirely,
the determination must await a decision from the all-mighty State. No
secular meaning exists for this terminology, and therefore, the exemption
makes the State the arbiter of religion according to vague, elastic, and
inherently religious, concepts.'O°
100. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1) (Deering 2003); N.Y. INS.
LAW. § 4303(cc)(1)(A) (McKinney 2003).
101. Mother Teresa would fail at least the prong of the exemption limiting her service
primarily to Catholics. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(C) (Deering
2003). For the work of Mother Teresa, see, e.g., A Tribute to the "Saint of the Gutters,"
http://www.cnn.com/world/9709/mother.teresa/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
102. Real Parties Answer Brief at 15-19, Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 182 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), review granted, 112
Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (Cal. 2001).
103. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(A) (Deering 2003); N.Y. INS.
LAW § 4303(cc)(1)(A) (McKinney 2003).
104. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533
(1993). Use of inherently religious terminology makes the exemption non-neutral under
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Id. Other cases have rejected attempts by the State to
allocate among activities of religious charity or tasks of employees, supposedly regulating
the "secular" and exempting the "religious". Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335,
1346 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Espinoza v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 479-82 (10th Cir. 1980), summ.
affd, 456 U.S. 951 (1982); Montrose Christian Sch. Corp. v. Walsh, 770 A.2d 111, 128-29
(Md. 2001). In University of Great Falls, the NLRB found a Catholic college to be a
"secular institution" because it admitted non-Catholics as students, hired non-Catholics as
faculty, and respected other religious expressions on campus. Univ. of Great Falls, 278
F.3d at 1337. The D.C. Circuit held that:
to limit.., exemption to religious institutions with hard-nosed proselytizing... is
an unnecessarily stunted view of the law, and perhaps even itself a violation of
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In addition, to qualify for an exemption an institution must employ
"primarily" those who "share the religious tenets" of the employer.' 5
Whether this is a numerical test based on church membership or
affiliation versus those employees who actually practice the faith, or is a
doctrinal test based on agreement with the Church on contraception, the
test is still based on religious action alone.O6 The exemption further
requires service "primarily" to those "who share the religious tenets of
the entity."' Whether the State will decide this means that a Catholic
Charities agency must serve only Roman Catholics versus all Eastern
Rite Catholics in union with the Pope of Rome, or whether their decision
will be based on agreement with some specific set of beliefs versus all
religious tenets, illustrates the patent unconstitutionality of the
exemption. In other words, the State is administering a process based on
vague and elastic words that lack any secular meaning. In measuring the
religiosity of the social gospel practiced by any agency, how can the State
make that decision without resorting to its own potentially
unconstitutional decision about what religion is and what it means?
While the elasticity and vagueness of the terms implicates the autonomy
rights of religious institutions, the inherent and undeniable religiosity of
the terminology is what makes it non-neutral and religiously offensive.'9
Under either test, the law is unconstitutional.
However, for argument's sake, assume the State correctly asserts that
the law is neutral. By arrogating the power of careful definition and
avoiding derogatory statements about religion, the government says it
can ignore the legitimate concerns of religion and still interfere in a
religious workplace. The result is an attempt to coerce religion to
abandon its teachings or withdraw from serving the society, but that
the most basic command of the Establishment Clause-not to prefer some
religions (and thereby some approaches to indoctrinating religion) to others.
Id.
105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(B) (Deering 2003); N.Y. INS.
LAW § 4303(cc)(1)(A).
106. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1) (Deering 2003); N.Y. INS. LAW §
4303(cc)(1)(A).
107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1)(C) (Deering 2003); N.Y. INS.
LAW § 4303(cc)(1)(A).
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1) (Deering 2003); N.Y. INS. LAW §
4303(cc)(1)(A). Both sets of issues are implicated here. The State claims the power to
decide who and what are religious. That power is the very power rejected by the Court in
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944), the power to determine what is, and is
not, orthodox. As framed, the exemption violates the most basic restriction on the States'
power with respect to religion-that it has none. The exemption, like the statute it
modifies, is per se unconstitutional. The use of religious terms presents the same problem
as in Lukumi and triggers strict scrutiny, another means to render the statute
unconstitutional. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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attempt is valid, according to the State, if done in a neutral way.
Therefore, health insurance is simply that; it is not a statement about
religion. In the California legislative debates, it was questioned whether
anyone, including Catholics, according to polling data introduced into the
legislative record, could have any real objection to expanding access to
contraception.109 Using this analysis in future cases, for example, the
government might say, "food" is food; it has not barred or regulated
kosher diets. More directly to the point, the State could determine what
constitutes healthcare if it prevails, even if the State determines
healthcare must include abortion. Citizens should be outraged at a
government that claims the unbridled power to remake agencies within
our society, while sweeping aside religious differences. As Jim Woods of
the Church-State Institute at Baylor University said, "[I]f we lose the
right to be different, we lose the right to be free."110  Plainly the
government does not possess the constitutional authority to remake
religious functions in a free society. The First Amendment circumscribes
the general powers of government, even its police powers. " ' There are
places that the government may not reach and there are constitutional,
not merely political, limits on what the government may do.
112
109. Petitioners Brief on the Merits, at 11 n.7, Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v.
Superior Ct., 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001) (indicating support of Catholics for contraceptives
and urging legislators to do the "right thing" by providing insurance coverage for
contraceptives).
110. Chopko, Intentional Values, supra note 76, at 1180.
111. U.S. CONST. amend I.
112. E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ("The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of
the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only."). It is interesting to contemplate why the mandates have any exemption,
even a contrived exemption, at all. There are only three possibilities: politics, the
Constitution, or both. The political explanation is that without the fig leaf of the
exemption, no mandate would pass. With the fig leaf, legislators are able to delude the
electorate and each other into believing the "real religious institutions" are exempted.
Without it, the State risks broadscale religious objections from citizens and groups who
can see this effort for the affront to religion that it is. The constitutional explanation is
that the State recognizes there are limits to its authority. Could the State coerce every
religious institution, even those who do not serve the public, such as a group of
contemplative religious women, to provide contraceptive coverage? If it did so, the
plaintiff would be a Mother Superior forced to fund morally offensive practices for
religious women, and a judgment of unconstitutionality likely would be automatic. Thus,
the case about mandates is a classic one concerning who decides where to draw the line
about religion. Normally, line drawing is the paradigmatic legislative function. However,
attempts to segregate "secular" from "religious" jobs in religious institutions are
invariably unconstitutional. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507
(1979); Espinoza v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 479-82 (10th Cir. 1980); Walsh v. Montrose
Christian Sch. Corp., 770 A.2d 111, 128-29 (Md. 2001). Classifying among institutions is
also unconstitutional. See Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1346 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
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Historically, those limits on government were well understood. It is
difficult to contemplate the framers of the First Amendment debating
the extent to which the government might intrude into the internal affairs
of religious institutions. The idea that government could even consider
seeking such invasive authority with respect to religion, much less wield
it, was simply beyond the Framers' contemplation."' The fight over
those limits in contemporary society has been joined in earnest and will
be significant not just for the shape of the Church, but also for the shape
of a free society.
In addition to the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, these
regulatory mandates also implicate the rights of speech and association.
The Supreme Court has held that free speech protects not only spoken
and written words, but also expressive conduct.14 The Court has stated
that, "[I]mplicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit
of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
cultural ends."' .. The Court clearly rejected governmental "intrusion
into the internal structure or affairs of an association" when it limits a
group's ability to communicate its message. 116  Free speech and
association, therefore, offer protection against a state-enforced
orthodoxy.
In a particular application, the Supreme Court has held that compelled
funding of conduct contrary to one's belief violates these guarantees.'
1 7
What one does, as much as what one says, expresses what one believes.
Indeed, conduct often does more than words to express one's true
religious convictions: "Religion may have as much to do with why one
takes an action as it does with what action one takes."1 8 In the Christian
tradition, a faith not expressed in conduct is inauthentic."9 Religious
organizations cannot condemn something as immoral, and then fund that
very immoral act through their institutions. Indeed, they have a right not
113. See Thomas J. Curry, Religion and the Constitution Confounded: Treating the First
Amendment as a Theological Statement, Religion & Culture Web Forum (Sept. 2003),
available at http://marty-center.uchicago.edu/webforum/092003/Curry%20essay.pdf.
114. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-07 (1969).
115. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984). Roberts is cited with
approval in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990), and Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000).
116. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
117. E.g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 222, 235 (1977).
118. Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
119. See, e.g., 1 John 2:3-6; James 2:14-26.
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to propound a view contrary to their beliefs. 2 ° "If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."'' 2' Regulatory mandates, if upheld, would void this
constitutional tenet by forcing Catholic agencies to fund something that
contravenes its body of Catholic teaching.
Even if the Constitution did not protect an institution's religious
freedom and other freedoms, such as speech and association, the diverse
set of institutions serving our society still deserve the right to be
different. Left alone, our diverse peoples would create diverse
institutions to serve their legitimate needs. But the question is not
whether there is room in this society for the delivery of health, education,
and social services by religiously diverse means. The people have
already answered that question. 22 The question is whether, in pursuit of
government-defined orthodoxy, the government has the right and the
power to remake, or suppress, the religiously and philosophically diverse
institutions created by our pluralistic citizenry. What is truly at stake is
the claimed power of government to remake the churches in the graven
image of the golden calf, the State. It is unfathomable why the danger,
the lunacy, the repugnance-if not the patent unconstitutionality-of
that claimed power is not self-evident to all citizens.
IV. THE IMPACT OF SCANDAL
The scandal, given new life in 2002 with the first re-reporting of the
situation in Boston, did not begin overnight and it will not soon pass
from the scene."' The scandal was not the creation of the Boston Globe
nor any other media outlet; rather, it was created by a failure in the
leadership of the Church, not everywhere or across the board, but in
120. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
121. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
122. For example, the wide array of public and private institutions, including religious
institutions serving the people, is testament to the pluralism and diversity of the country
and those who serve it.
123. BETRAYAL, supra note 37, at 25, 29, 53. A portion of an Internet site for
journalists catalogues and updates stories on sexual abuse in the Catholic Church. Poynter
Online Abuse Tracker, available at http://www.Poynter.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
Publications of the Pew-supported Center for the Study of Religion in Public Life
repeatedly commented about the size and lingering impacts of the scandal and the
unprecedented media attention. The Leonard Greenburg Center for the Study of
Religion in Public, Child Abuse, Children's Rights, Pedophilia, available at
http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/indexArchive/childabuse.htm (last visited Nov. 18,
2003). Also, the notion of the Church scandals figures briefly in popular fiction, e.g.,
reflecting poorly on trust and faith in the church. See DAN BROWN, THE DA VINCI CODE
(NY: Bantam Dell, 2003).
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enough places to raise, in the minds of the faithful, legitimate questions
of the type with which this article began: who is driving and where are we
going? This scandal is the Church's ENRON. Church leaders did not
enrich themselves at the expense of the faithful or their works, but some
of them failed in a more fundamental way. The Church has set high
standards for itself and the world, and thus should not be surprised when
those same standards are applied to it.
This institution of the Catholic Church was founded to lead people by
speaking the truth about life, salvation and eternal life. Some of the
leaders of this institution did not trust the people with the truth about
their own ministers. 24 People had legitimate questions about who was
allowed to minister to them and why. These questions all had fair
answers-answers that were sometimes not given or were lost in the
storm that began to blow again in 2002. Because the initial answers by
Church leaders were inadequate, in fact, they were withdrawn, updated,
and recast; people lost faith in the ability or willingness of all the leaders
of the Church to tell the truth, the whole truth. Because the process
itself was secret and accountable to only the Bishop, additional concerns
arose as to how the problems escalated. In turn, the faithful called for
increased scrutiny by the government because the Church's responses
were considered at best, incomplete and unreliable, and at worst,
downright dishonest. 2 6 The conduct of some in leadership could not
have come at a worse time for the Church, already facing enormous
pressures by litigants and regulators to force religious institutions to
conform to the general secular model."' In 2002, through the Church's
wrong actions, the door has been opened for government more
vigorously to cross the constitutional boundary between the business of
religion and the business of government, and to remake the Church in
124. See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Diocesan Policies Dealing with
Sexual Abuse of Minors, (Nov. 1994), available at http://www.usccb.org/comm/kit3.htm
(discussing the treatment of complaints in the media). The Bishops' ad hoc Committee on
Sexual Abuse identified some disclosure about the background of the person as one of the
prerequisites for re-assignment. Id. Other prerequisites were successful completion of
therapy and aftercare, a strong supervisory or monitoring program, the lack of public
scandal, and favorable review by a dioceses advisory board or team, which was a precursor
to the dioceses review boards in 2003. Id.
125. See BETRAYAL, supra note 37, at 101. Several days after the initial reporting in
January 2002, the Archbishop held a news conference in which he stated emphatically
that, to his knowledge, there were no priests in ministry who had committed sexual crimes
against minors. Id. That statement was revised and explained several times over the
intervening days and weeks. Id.
126. See, e.g., AG Wants Church to Report Past Sex Abuse, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17,
2002, available at http://www.Boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/011702-ag.htm.
127. See supra Part II.
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dangerous ways. We look for strong, effective, and moral leaders when
we need them most. Someone has to say "enough is enough."
V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM THE 2002 SCANDAL
Three areas where the scandal of 2002 has exacerbated existing
problems or created new ones for the Church are in governance, liability,
and public responsibility.
A. Governance
For more than a century, canon lawyers and civil lawyers have
discussed and considered the best civil law structures to use for the
patrimony of the Church.128 It appears that the civil structures used by
United States dioceses follow historical patterns and have more to do
with custom and comfort than anything else.29 In the last twenty years
since the New Code of Canon Law, there is increasing discussion about
the propriety of certain corporate forms such as the sole corporation ."0
The liability crunch that all institutions have faced in the same period of
time has accelerated the attention given to these questions. 3' When
dioceses create new collections, central schools, or endowment funds,
they are more likely to pay attention to whether the new matter is a part
of the central administrative structure.32 If not, the entity takes a
separate form, usually a corporation or trust.
133
Recently, renewed attention has focused on the structures that exist
within the Church or each diocese, but little real attention has been given
as to why these structures exist. Media, including even the most
reputable periodicals like the Wall Street Journal, have reported that the
dioceses that have been structured as multiple corporations for a century
128. THOMAS W. SPALDING, THE PREMIER SEE 116-17 (1989). Parish Trustees often
controlled parish property and competed with Bishops. Id. Baltimore received authority
for a "corporation sole" in 1832, and became the model for similar laws in other states. Id.
In the 1960s, property was transferred back to parish corporations, partially for liability
reasons. Id. at 430-31. A parish is a public juridic person and is capable of ownership and
administration of parish property under the canon law. NEW COMMENTARY ON THE
CODE OF CANON LAW c.116, c.1255, c.1256 (John P. Beal, et al. eds., 2000).
129. Mark E. Chopko, Control of and Administration for Separately-Incorporated
Works of the Diocesan Church, Colloquium on Public Ecclesiastical Juridic Persons, 79-80
(Angelicum/Duquesne 1998). Cf. Canon 1284(2)(3), NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE
OF CANON LAW, supra note 128.
130. NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 128, at c.1256.
131. See William McCarthy, Diocesan Asset Management Strategies: The Civil Law
Perspective, 37 CATH. LAW. 117, 118-21 (1996).
132. Id. at 118.
133. Id.
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or more, do so to hide assets from plaintiffs. 134 The scandal has increased
the scrutiny and attributed improper motives to matters of ordinary
business planning. The DePaul Institute for Church-State Studies
completed a study on the structure of America's religions, finding a
number of corporate and other forms adopted by religious institutions,
which concern their own understanding of how they should be organized
and how a church should best express itself. 3 1 Such patterns, structures,
affiliations, allocation of ecclesial responsibility, supervision (or
autonomy), and governance reflect religious practices about basic polity
issues. Unfortunately, what was accepted as normative church planning
and organization is now under a microscope. Self-expression of the
religious polity is under assault.
B. Liability
Dean Nicholas Cafardi of the Duquesne Law School has said that
Americans use litigation to show their displeasure. 3 1 If so, they are very
displeased with the Church. Years ago, most of the victims that came to
the Church sought two things: an apology or acknowledgment; and
assurance that such misconduct could never occur again. 137 The Church's
institutional failure to deliver on these basic needs helped fuel the
scandal of 2002 and the litigation in between."' The bottom line is that
dioceses and religious institutes should not seek out litigation as a first
resort, nor should they provoke plaintiffs into such a forum. If sued,
however, the Church has the same right to defend itself as anyone else.
Failing to defend itself would expose the patrimony of the Church,
134. Milo Geyelin, Beseiged Church Tries to Protect Vast Real Estate, WALL ST. J.,
May 15, 2002, at Al. Although I explained the canon civil issues to the Wall Street Journal
in three interviews lasting more than four hours, apparently it did not fit the story line. I
do not appear in the story, and neither does the correct view of the Church's internal law.
135. CRAIG B. MOUSIN, THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICA'S CHURCHES: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE IMPACT OF LEGAL STRUCTURES ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (forthcoming
Carolina Academic Press, 2004).
136. Nicholas P. Cafardi, Giving Legal Life to the Ex Corde Ecclesial Norms:
Corporate Strategies and Practical Difficulties, 25 J.C. & U.L. 751, 765 (1999).
137. This conclusion is my own opinion, derived from observing hundreds of
individual cases.
138. This observation, of course, also is my private opinion but one based on the
observation of hundreds of cases, and discussions with countless lawyers on both sides and
diocesan victim assistance personnel over the years. Compensation was secondary to the
victims. That fact seemed truer years ago than today, where the monetary claims seem to
have a greater prominence. Said another way, when I first started in this work, it was just
as likely that dioceses would hear directly from victims (or their parents) than from a
lawyer. Today it seems most claims are stated in the courts (or at least the press) first.
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dedicated to the service of the people and the community, to potentially
ruinous dissipation.'"
Every first-year law student knows that liability follows• •• 140
responsibility. If a religious body structures itself in a particular way,
placing responsibility for some action in a specific body or structure, that
body or structure (and not some other entity) has responsibility and
liability for the failure of responsibility. 4 1 In N.H. v. Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), the supervision and discipline of ministers was placed in
regional judiciaries, not in local congregations or in the national
assembly. 42 Thus, civil courts must respect the structural demarcations
between entities. Moreover, in the case of religion, the allocation of
responsibility among various entities is done for religious reasons
respecting the denomination's self-understanding of each entity's role. A
grandiose complaint against a religious body, such as in N.H. v.
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 43 or the Dallas litigation, invites the civil
courts to disregard the basic rules of corporate and constitutional law to
remake the polity.'44
In addition, the scandal has brought criminal actions to the threshold
of the Church. 145  Certainly, priests who abused children committed
crimes. Their religious superiors, however, are another matter. Absent a
legal requirement, usually one based on an intention to harm a child or
aid in the commission of a crime, it is difficult to discern the criminal
139. Again, this is my private opinion. The absence of legal liability (due to statute of
limitations or failure to state a claim) does not mean the end of moral responsibility to
assist victims.
140. Chopko, Ascending Liability, supra note 29, at 292-95.
141. See id. at 289; see also Chopko, supra note 26, at 1096-97.
142. N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A), 998 P.2d 592, 598 (Okla. 1999).
143. See, e.g., id. at 594.
144. Generally, facts pleaded in a complaint are regarded as true for the purposes of
ruling on a motion to dismiss. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (indicating that pleadings should be
liberally construed). To make a stronger case, litigants claim facts as true regarding
religious structure, doctrine, or authority, essentially pleading a polity that sometimes
bears no resemblance to the actual polity. See, e.g., N.H., 998 P.2d at 594-98. Motions to
dismiss that challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of courts, however, shift the burden
to plaintiffs and false facts may not be regarded as true. Hiles v. Episcopal Diocese of
Mass., 773 N.E.2d 929, 938 (Mass. 2002); Bryce v. Episcopal Church, 121 F.Supp. 2d 1327,
1334 (D. Colo. 2000), affd, 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002).
145. The New Hampshire Attorney General crossed the threshold, using a broad
construction of the state's child endangerment law and an even broader interpretation of
"knowing." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 626:2, 639:3 (1995). See John S. Baker, Jr.,
Prosecuting Dioceses and Bishops, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1067-68 (2003). See generally
The Diocese of Manchester Ministries & Services, http://www.catholicchurchnh.org/
ministriesservices content.cfm?docid=740 (last visited Nov. 18, 2003) (providing
background information on the issue from the Office of the Delegate for Sexual
Misconduct).
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elements that would be involved. Nonetheless, aggressive prosecutors,
with the stick of grand jury subpoenas and potential fines and
punishments, review the deliberations of priest personnel boards and
second-guess assignment decisions made generations ago under different• 146
circumstances. The result has been a series of reports, based on
selective testimony and without cross examination, that proves to be
derogatory to the Church. The actions of religious superiors might have
141been misguided, but not criminal. On the other hand, in some
instances where Bishops have removed priests, some accused priests
have retaliated with defamation and other lawsuits, and even some have
sued the victims.148
Finally, some of the novel claims are fanciful: there is no RICO
liability in sexual misconduct cases for personal injury, there is no
liability in the Holy See,5 and confidentiality agreements negotiated in
good faith between litigants and approved by a judge are not part of a
diocesan cover-up. 5' Frankly, the financial demands of some claimants,
and their lawyers, are so large that they are forcing litigation rather than
inviting compromise.'52 The huge Dallas verdict in 1997 has so skewed
146. For example, in 2003 the Archdiocese of Cincinnati pled that it failed to report
felonies a generation ago. Ohio v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, Case No. B0311000, Ct.
Com. P1. Hamilton County, Ohio. See generally Baker, supra note 145, at 1061 (noting the
inherent difficulties with prosecutions for church scandal cases and arguing that "bishops
and their dioceses are not proper targets for possible criminal indictment for the crimes of
individual priests").
147. If indeed Bishops satisfied the criminal standard, an indictment is not out of the
question at this writing. More worrisome is the publication of "reports" that present "the
case" for church wrongdoing with no opportunity for the other side to present evidence.
See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, LI. Diocese Deceived Victims of Abuse, a Grand Jury
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at Al; Daniel J. Wakin, Rockville Centre Bishop Rebuts
Grand Jury Report, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at B5.
148. Catholic Priests Sue Accusers in Civil Court, JEFFERSON CITY NEWS TRIB., Aug.
30, 2002, available at http://newstribune.com/stories/083002/wor_0830020907.asp.
149. RICO claims do not lie for personal injuries and raise difficult First Amendment
issues with respect to religion. E.g., Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417, 422 (5th
Cir. 2001); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F.Supp. 1125, 1135, 1139 (D. Mass.
1982).
150. The Holy See, as a state, enjoys sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. 1604 (2000).
Therefore, its actions are not subject to review in U.S. Courts. English v. Thorne, 676
F.Supp. 761, 764 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
151. But see Elissa Gootman, Vindication, and Sadness, at Release of Jury Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2003, at B6. The issue of litigants' confidentiality agreements also is
complex. Also perplexing is that many lawsuits are commenced in the name of "Doe"
plaintiffs, who themselves do not want disclosure. E.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 352
(Fla. 2002) (identifying plaintiffs as Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II).
152. Gustav Niebuhr, Dioceses Settle Case of Man Accusing Priest of Molestation, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2001, at A17 (pointing out that a recent Dallas jury award of $120 million,
although reduced by the judge, nonetheless "created a more adversarial legal environment
with which Catholic authorities have had to contend").
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the negotiating table that insurers would rather defend than settle,153
which means that we go off to war instead of determining how to win the
peace.
The situation has degenerated to such an extent that the Church has
already seen more than a thousand new claims and claimants over the
past twenty-four months beginning in January 2002. The toxic media
attention to every action, construing every ambiguous passage or kind
reference to indicate a lapse of morality, '-4 treating every reported
allegation as true, giving undue attention to half-truths about the church
in grandiose lawsuits (but virtually no attention to their dismissal or
withdrawal),15 is too long and complex a subject for this article; however,
every litigator recognizes the deliberate effect that media attention has
on the jury pool and on the legislatures.5  Consequently, legislators in a
number of states have been invited to narrow the privileges available for
all churches,57 to drop the statutes of limitations for all charitable and
child caring institutions, 58 and to flirt wholesale with the disregard of
constitutional principles, 9 such as not policing the internal affairs of
churches.
153. Id.
154. Complimentary language in letters to clerics from Bishops does not indicate
agreement with the conduct, but in my long experience, it is simply the way that clerics
talk to each other. Even so, I confess, that I am unable to explain all of what I have read
in the public record.
155. For example, there was an abundance of news coverage surrounding RICO suits
against dioceses, orders, and the Holy See. See CBSNews.com, New Tactic in Catholic Sex
Scandal, Mar. 22, 2003, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/03/22/national/
printable504352.shtml (last visited Nov. 18, 2003) (indicating that although plaintiffs have
sued under federal racketeering laws, such suits have often failed); Amy Driscoll, Church
Faces Racketeering Suit, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 22, 2002, available at
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/2910364.htm (announcing an ex-seminarian's
racketeering claims against a former Florida Bishop). By contrast, no news coverage
occurred when the claims in Los Angeles and Florida were withdrawn; the coverage was
almost non-existent. The best example is the Dallas Morning News report of Bishops'
alleged actions concerning accused priests on the eve of the June Bishops meeting.
Brooks Egerton & Reese Dunklin, Two-Thirds of Bishops Let Accused Priests Work,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 12, 2002, available at
http://www.dallasnews.com/religion/bishops/stories/061202dnmetntlbishops.49a25.html.
The report simply repeats claims (even unproved ones), but not their resolution. Id.
156. Nina Schuyler, Searching for the Tort Reform Playbook of the Corporate Defense
Bar, CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, at 17-19, Spring 2002, available at http://www.lawexec.com/
CLO/0302Articles/pl6.pdf.
157. Peter Smith, Law Maker Tackles Clergy Abuse Cases, Bill Would Unseal Abusers'
Confessions, COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan. 8, 2003, at http://www.courier-journal.com/
localnews/2003/01/08/ke010803s345077.htm.
158. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 340.1 (Deering 2003). California suspended its statute of
limitations in civil cases for a year. Id. §§ 340.1(b), (c).
159. See U.S. CONST. amend I.
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Litigation will waste resources on attacking and defending the Church
that can be better spent resolving claims with fairness and justice.
Bankrupting churches and forcing them to recede from the ministries of
preaching, teaching, sanctifying, and serving is not the answer. It has
come as quite a shock to the news media over the last year, that the vast
majority of the money contributed by the faithful every Sunday remains
in the parish where it is directly applied, and consumed.' 6°  The
contributions are used for the daily life of the parish church: keeping the
lights and heat on, running schools and homeless shelters, and reaching
out to the poor and vulnerable.16' The money is not there for the taking
(or even the giving) without the pinch being felt somewhere else in the
Church's life. 16 Yet, even if no legal liability exists, there are obligations
in justice to which lawyers for the Church must respond. If the Church is
able to see beyond the smoke of litigation and give of its resources, will
the insurers and the lawyers do the same? Insurers can give a little more
by way of proceeds, and lawyers can reduce their own contingency fees
and compensation if such actions result in better and more efficient
compensation for victims. To move beyond the present moment,
individuals within the Church must feel the pain of those victims to make
the Church whole again. Both the Church and the victims must respond
with justice. The Bishops have apologized and declared a scandal will
161never happen again. We must hold them to that commitment.
C. Responsibility
There are increased internal and external pressures from the Church
for leaders to be transparent and accountable. 64 The Church's law
provides for a number of structures and consultative bodies. The law
116invites the publication of financial reports and accounting to donors.
160. Mark M. Gray & Mary Gautier, GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. FOR APPLIED
RESEARCH IN THE APOSTOLATE, INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL
DIOCESAN PROFILE 2003,9 (2003).
161. See William C. Symonds, The Economic Strain on the Church, BUS. WK., Apr. 15,
2002, at 35.
162. See id.
163. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Charter for the Protection of
Children and Young People Revised Edition, Preamble (2002), available at
http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2003).
164. Id. at arts. 7, 8. The Office of Child & Youth Protection (USCCB) has produced
a public report on diocesan efforts to repsond to the Charter. See
http://www.usccb.org/ocyp/audit 2003/report.htm.
165. THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY c.1277, c.1278, c.1280
(James A. Coriden, et al. eds., 1985) (providing for involvement of consultors and a
finance council in the administration of property).
166. THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY c. 1284(2)(8), 1287(2)
(James A. Coriden, et al. eds., 1985).
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Individual donors are insisting on new assurances about protecting
donations from use in litigation or settling claims.167 Tax and law
enforcement authorities are inquiring about the sources of funds for
certain payments and activities.168 The turnoff of individual contributors
creates a drain on some diocesan finances that, coupled with a downturn
in the economy, has necessitated layoffs and reductions in services at a
time when the Church's institutions are under greatest pressure. 16' The
biggest sign of the impact on donors and the faithful was the report of
one Bishop during the discussion in the Dallas meeting about a national
day of reconciliation and penance. He reported that one member of the
faithful asked him why the people should do penance for the Bishops,
when it should be the other way around. 70
The impact on responsibility occurs significantly in the area of public
witness. Church leaders are questioned about why they would testify in
Congress about protecting children in Africa when they have not
protected the Catholic children entrusted to their care in the United
States. The messenger is being shot, in part because the messenger is
disliked, even if the message itself is truthful and vital to the formation of
a moral policy. A curious example of this situation occurred in the
Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia,"' striking down as
unconstitutional the application of the death penalty to mentally
retarded prisoners. 72 The Court's jurisprudence for a half century has
required the Eighth Amendment and the death penalty to be measured
against the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.' '173 That inquiry is a moral question that requires resort
to the views of moral institutions: religious bodies. On behalf of a group
of religious bodies in the United States, Christian and non-Christian,
western and eastern religions, the USCCB filed a brief asking the Court
167. Cf THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY c. 1267(3) (James
A. Coriden, et al. eds., 1985).
168. Mary Zahn, Sklba Defends Weakland Settlement, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June
15, 2002, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/metro/june02/51326.asp. The Boston
Archdiocese produced detailed financial data to convince donors that their gifts were
being properly used. Michael Paulsen, Church to Post Details of Its Budget, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 7, 2003, at Al, available at http://www.boston.com/globe
/spotlight/abuse/stories4/050703_budget.htm.
169. ACC Leadership Team Enters Transition Phase, TIDINGS, Nov. 8, 2002, at 2
(reporting on the significant restructuring of the Los Angeles archdiocesan staff in 2002,
due in part to economic problems).
170. See generally An Invitation to Prayer, June 3, 2003, at
http://www.usccb.org/comm/pray.htm (asking the faithful to pray for victims and Bishops
during the Dallas conference).
171. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
172. Id. at 318-26.
173. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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to recognize these religious voices as important to the resolution of the• 174
question. The brief also asked the Court to express the views of these
representative religious bodies that believed the application of the death
penalty to the mentally retarded was immoral, was not reflective of a
civilized society, and should be ruled unconstitutional.'75 The majority
opinion decided in June 2002, one week after the Bishops' meeting in
Dallas, so noted the brief.176 In his dissent, the Chief Justice noted the
brief, and said such views were legally irrelevant. 77 Justice Scalia, who is
Catholic, went beyond the Chief Justice's statement to say: "The
attitudes of [the United States Catholic Conference] regarding crime and
punishment are so far from being representative, even of the views of
ordinary Catholics, that they are currently the object of intense national
(and entirely ecumenical) criticism. ,178
VI. STRUGGLING WITH SCANDAL
It is unacceptable to demand that the Church's witness be silenced
because of the sins of a few of its ministers and the inept behavior of a
few of its leaders. Long-term principles must not be sacrificed for short-
term punishments. Voices of religion are essential to shaping a free
society. Moral questions pervade public policy and demand moral
voices. Should we be at war with Iraq? Should we tax ourselves more to
care for the poor? Should we restructure the way education is delivered?
Should we execute snipers even if they are minors? These questions go
to the heart of who we are as a people, struggling to shape a society to be
more just, more charitable, more loving, and more chaste. George
Washington made plain that the shape of this democracy depends on the
voices of religion for stability and values. 179 That statement is even more
true today. The message cannot be discarded on account of the
sinfulness of a few of the messengers.
174. Brief of Amici Curiae of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al.
in Support of Petitioner at 1, McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (No. 00-
8727).
175. Id. Although the brief was filed in McCarver v. North Carolina, it was transferred
to Atkins when McCarver was rendered moot. McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975
(2001).
176. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316-17 n.21.
177. Id. at 325-26 (Rehnquist, C. J. dissenting).
178. Id. at 347 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It could be that Justice Scalia was
commenting on the apparent rejection by Catholics of the Holy Father's condemnation of
the death penalty. See id. That the Church leadership is ahead of the flock would,
however, warrant different wording. This sentence may be viewed as a slap at the Church
over the scandal and, if so, warrants some explanation from the Justice.
179. 149 CONG. REC. S2549 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (annual reading of Washington's
farewell address on his birthday). Washington said that "religion and morality are
indispensable supports" for national prosperity and stability. Id. at S2552.
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The scandal also gives pause to ask whether it will be the excuse to
abandon time-tested constitutional principles about the properly limited
role of government in regulating the internal operations of religious
institutions. The handiwork of legislatures and regulators has placed
pressure on religious institutions ,8° but it has been made worse by
scandal. Scandal causes merited and principled arguments about the
autonomy of religious institutions to sound hollow and empty. 1  It
causes legislators and judges to give less credence to those arguments in
particular cases. 182 It incites those who have policy agendas that run
counter to religious institutions to take new interest in commencing
campaigns that limit the reach and impact of religion."3
Scandal, however perceived, is never a reason to abandon the rule of
law. Even worse, one cannot use scandal as a reason to secularize and
abandon religious institutions. In Robert Bolt's play A Man for All
Seasons, Thomas More says he would "g[i]ve the devil the benefit [of the
rule] of law," for when all the laws are twisted and rent, and torn down
by the State to do its will, where will the just find shelter? 14 If this excuse
is allowed to limit or void vital constitutional principles, society will come
to regret and rue the day when the rights of society's vital mediating
institutions were traded for policing and punishment. Lawyers have a
particular responsibility by virtue of our professional oaths to preserve
180. See supra Part III.B.
181. For example, the police could not demand a place at the table of a priest,
minister, or rabbi personnel board to assure the purity of candidates for parochial
assignment. That is unconstitutional. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971)
(holding that government must avoid excessive entanglement with religion). It seems to
be a short step, if one at all, to the grand jury second-guessing of those decisions a
generation later. Yet, resisting a subpoena on sound legal principle provokes a negative
reaction in the public and the press. Invoking the rule of law, even correctly, appears as if
the Church has something to hide.
182. E.g., Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 608-09
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (giving extraordinary scrutiny to adult consensual behavior).
183. Larry Witham, Church Faces Calls for Complete Change, WASH. TIMES, July 7,
2002, at A04. The story reported Planned Parenthood's announcement that it would not
desist from its efforts to restrict the Church and advance its agenda for contraceptive
equality. Id. Indeed, in this political environment, why should it?
184. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 66 (First Vintage Int'l Ed. Vintage
Books 1990). The dialogue between More and his son-in-law, Roper, about the law is a
classic. More comments that his enemy, Rich, is free to come and go.
More: And go he should, if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the law!
Roper: So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!
More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after
the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you
- where would you hide Roper, the laws all being flat?
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the rule of law and not to abandon constitutional precepts. Remaking
the Church in the image of the government was not the answer in the
eighteenth century and is not the answer in the twenty-first either.
VII. RECOVERING THE CHURCH
Who, then is driving the cab called "Church," and where is it going?
Clearly, some people have decided to make their own way and choose
what they deem an appropriate direction for the Church. Many issues
must and will be addressed as the Church moves forward and evolves in
ways as yet imperceptible.
For what it is worth, I believe that the Church has started on the right
path. The Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People is a
good beginning-just the beginning-to making things right, and to
restore not just confidence and trust, but pride in the Church. If the crux
of the problem was failure to trust the people with the truth about the
men ministering to them and the secrecy in the review and assignment
system, opening up that process to legitimate lay assistance is part of the
remedy. Pulling back the cloak of secrecy, the Church has a
responsibility to collaborate in this work in lay review boards, in financial
transparency, and in calling its leaders to the task of doing things right.
Unfortunately, future abuse in the Church may be unavoidable.' That
these cases occur only marks the humanity or weakness of the people
within the Church. But the true measure of progress will be whether the
victims are treated with the respect and dignity they deserve.
Ultimately, the people of God must take a stand as to whether we
believe that God still lives through this institution we love and whether it
is worth preserving, allowing it to shape itself to God's will, not ours. We
citizens of this country have to decide whether the limits on government
can be disregarded in this time of crisis and scandal. Church and State
meet in the person, the child of God, and the citizen of this country.16
Religious liberty is a human right because it allows the person to seek the
185. The New York Times survey on priest abuses and victims ended with a reference
to a professional opinion that the Church will see an influx of cases in 2005. Laurie
Goodstein, Trail of Pain in Church Crisis Leads to Nearly Every Diocese, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2003, at Al. But an influx would mean that, despite the thousands of new cases
coming forward, there are still many who will wait. Right now, the media and political
environment are favorable and lawyers are actively seeking cases. Second, there are far
fewer instances of abuse reported after the diocesan policies went into effect in the early
1990s, and the reports are a fairly constant handful every year. Id. at A20 (charting the
percentage of priests accused, by year or ordination).
186. Raymond Cour, C.S.C., Catholics and Church-State Relations in America, in




Truth as revealed."" Religious liberty is a constitutional right to assure
that the search for the Truth, and the institutions created to express that
Truth in a society should be protected from the expansive powers of
government.1'8  Neither "Church" nor "State" exists in the abstract-
each has concrete expression in every person.
The shape of the Church in the next months and years will be different
than it was in the months and years we have just experienced.
Recovering the Church and preserving it from the secular forces that
buffet it will require the hard work and dedication of good and strong
women and men who will allow God's will to work, rather than their own
or the government's. Catholic people, especially Catholics in
government and law, must lead the way to resist change for its own sake
when the price tag is the surrender of religious witness, religious
expression, and religious institutions.
187. Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis Humanae, Second Vatican Council,
Dec. 7, 1965, available at http://www.christusrex.org/wwwl/CDHN/vlO.html.
188. ANSON STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 560 (1950) ("The
various governments in the United States do not merely refrain from interfering with
religious affairs, but act affirmatively to protect the public worship of all denominations ..
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